When popular referendums fail to ratify new international agreements or succeed in reversing existing ones, it not only affects domestic voters, but also creates negative spillovers for the other parties to such agreements. This paper explores how voters respond to this strategic environment. We use original survey data from a poll fielded just one day before the 2015 Greek bailout referendum Ð a referendum in which the stakes for other countries were particularly high Ð in order to investigate how expectations about the likely foreign response to a non-cooperative referendum outcome influence voting behavior and to what extent foreign policymakers can influence those expectations. Our analysis of the Greek referendum shows that such expectations had a powerful effect on voting behavior: voters expecting that a non-cooperative referendum outcome would force Greece to leave the Eurozone were substantially more likely to vote Yes than those believing that it would result in renewed negotiations with the countryÕs creditors. Leveraging the bank closure that took place right before the vote, we also show that costly signals by foreign actors made voters more pessimistic about the consequences of a non-cooperative vote and substantially increased the share of cooperative votes.
1.! Introduction
After decades of Ôever closerÕ international cooperation, the economic integration process has come under pressure in recent years. Faced with increasing trade-offs between the gains from international cooperation, democracy, and national sovereignty, 1 popular movements that aim at slowing down or even reversing international integration have proliferated. When such movements are successful, as in the case of the UKÕs ÒBrexitÓ referendum or the election of Donald Trump as US president, they challenge the viability of international institutions. The consequences of national democratic decisions can thus be felt strongly both domestically and internationally. In todayÕs interconnected world, such popular rejections of international cooperation, therefore, beg important questions with regard to international relations, national sovereignty, and democracy. To answer these questions, we need to better understand the motives underlying such rejections, the dilemmas and incentives such votes generate for policymakers, and the dynamics they produce in the international arena. In short, we need a better understanding of the mass politics of international cooperation and their implication for international relations. This paper seeks to hone our understanding of these issues by focusing on Europe, where integration-skeptic movements have been particularly successful and where popular referendums have allowed voters to decide directly on whether to accelerate, stop, or even reverse the highly advanced European integration process. An important feature of these decisions has been that their consequences extend well beyond the domestic realm. When referendums fail to ratify new cooperation agreements or succeed in reversing existing ones, they create negative spillovers for the other parties to such agreements, thus sparking fears of contagion and even disintegration. As a result, those other member-states have a clear interest in a cooperative referendum outcome. At the same time, they also have a range of options of how to respond to a negative referendum outcome and whether to accommodate the 1 Rodrik 2011 referendum countryÕs direct democratic choice or not. This creates interesting strategic dynamics in which foreign policymakers can interact with domestic voters during the referendum campaign in order to boost the cooperative vote.
Our paper sets out to explore how voters behave in this kind of strategic environment, especially how their expectations about foreign reactions to a non-cooperative referendum outcome shape their vote intentions and to what extent foreign policymakers can influence those expectations. For this purpose, we leverage a fascinating and important case of a foreign policy referendum in which the stakes of other countries were particularly high: the 2015 Greek bailout referendum. While on paper the referendum was simply meant to be about the terms of an international financial bailout package designed to tackle the countryÕs enormous financial crisis, it was widely feared at the time that a non-cooperative referendum outcome would put GreeceÕs entire Eurozone membership at risk. In addition, since a Greek exit from the currency union (colloquially referred to as ÒGrexitÓ) would put the irreversibility of the euro in question and would potentially create large contagion risks for other peripheral Eurozone countries, the referendum vote was also seen as a threat to the entire project of European monetary integration Ð with potentially enormous negative consequences for all other Eurozone members.
To investigate how expectations and foreign signals about the likely response to a non-cooperative outcome influenced individual vote choices in the 2015 Greek referendum, we use original survey data from a unique poll fielded just one day before the vote. Our analysis shows that expectations about the consequences of a non-cooperative referendum outcome can have a powerful effect on voting behavior: voters expecting that a No-vote would result in Grexit were substantially more likely to vote Yes, i.e., in favor of the proposed bailout agreement, than those believing that GreeceÕs creditors would accommodate a Novote by proposing better bailout terms in renewed negotiations. This effect was especially strong for the vast majority of voters who wanted to stay in the common currency. We also show that there is room for foreign actors to shift votersÕ expectations and decisions in their favor by signaling their resolve not to accommodate a non-cooperative vote: in fact, we find that, following the announcement of the referendum, the European Central BankÕs (ECB) decision not to increase capital injections into Greek banks Ð thereby forcing their closure Ð influenced expectations and increased the share of cooperative votes. Overall, this study helps refine our understanding of how the strategic international dimension shapes the mass politics of international cooperation.
2.! Expectations and foreign intervention in foreign policy referendum campaigns
By their very nature, the consequences of national referendums on foreign policy, especially those on treaties concerning international cooperation and supranational integration, are also felt abroad, affecting not only domestic voters but also citizens of other countries. When such a referendum results in a vote that enables the initiation, widening, or deepening of international cooperation, these cross-country spillover effects are usually net positive. By contrast, whenever the outcome of a national foreign policy referendum impedes a deepening or continuation of cooperation, it tends to generate net negative cross-border spillover effects. of a non-cooperative referendum outcome varies widely and depends on the specific circumstances of the referendum, such as the issue at stake, the political and economic importance of the referendum country for other countries, the level of integration, the rules of international cooperation, and the renegotiation process itself. Thus, spillover effects can be small, but they can also prove very costly for other member states, especially when the referendum outcome prevents other countries from cooperating further or even unilaterally challenges the status quo of an existing arrangement. All else equal, the more integrated the referendum country is within a politically interconnected and highly institutionalized organization (such as the EU), the larger the potential damage a negative referendum vote can cause abroad. And the higher the potential spillover effects are, the stronger the interest of other member states in a cooperation-friendly referendum outcome.
Yet, whereas the referendum country is free to vote in favor or against cooperation, the other countries are also free to choose how to react. A range of foreign responses is possible, ranging from more to less accommodating ones. For instance, foreign partners may accommodate the reservations of the dissenting country by modifying the agreement, granting exceptions, or negotiating a new one that better reflects the concerns of the referendum country. But they can also pursue more hardline responses such as making no concessions or simply moving forward without the referendum country. This type of decision is not easy because the other countries face a dilemma: accommodating the democratically expressed wishes of the referendum countryÕs electorate allows them to salvage as many of the cooperation gains as possible but also carries moral hazard and political contagion risks, as other countries might be incentivized to call national referendums to improve their relative position in the union. On the other hand, pursuing a hard stance vis-ˆ-vis the referendum country allows them to discourage such opportunistic behavior, yet it is likely to be costly for everyone involved because of the foregone gains from cooperation. This dilemma will be particularly pronounced when the potential spillover effects of a negative referendum vote are large.
Whatever the most likely strategic response on the part of other member states, this response strongly determines how a negative referendum vote would ultimately play out for the referendum country. It thus shapes the underlying stakes of the referendum vote for everyone involved, including above all the referendum country itself. From the viewpoint of the referendum country, these stakes are lowest when a non-cooperative vote carries small negative externalities, and highest in referendums that leave the other countries highly exposed. This is because high spillover effects typically increase the range of (re-)negotiation options available to the countries involved, as more issue areas are affected and because a higher level of integration increases interdependence between states. Taken together with imperfect information over both the true preferences of multiple actors and the magnitude of spillover effects that have yet to materialize, this variability of final payoffs effectively renders the consequences of a non-cooperative referendum vote uncertain ex ante. 3 Because the consequences of a negative referendum outcome depend so strongly on the other countriesÕ response, voters are likely to take that into account when deciding how to vote. Policy preferences and expectations about those responses should hence jointly determine voting decisions in foreign policy referendums. 4 Not surprisingly, foreign policy referendum campaigns are often characterized by distinct and often contradictory narratives about the risks and benefits associated with referendum outcomes. 5 In such politicized environments, voters will form certain sets of beliefs about how foreign actors will react to a non-cooperative referendum vote. These expectations are likely to influence their voting behavior, especially in cases in which the spillover effects of their decision are potentially large. 6 The more a voter believes in the likelihood of punishment for non-cooperation, the more likely that voter is to vote for cooperation. Given the importance of votersÕ expectations in shaping vote intentions, all actors with a stake in the referendum outcome, including domestic and foreign ones, have the an incentive to influence these expectations. Foreign policymakers in particular may seek to sway voters towards a cooperative vote by coaxing them through normative appeals and promises of future benefits, or by threatening them with negative consequences in the case of a non-cooperative referendum outcome (in fact, they may also try to directly influence public opinion during the campaign, as the recent revelations about RussiaÕs efforts to meddle in Western elections show). Especially when other countries would be worse off under all potential outcomes of a non-cooperative referendum vote compared to the outcomes associated with a cooperative referendum vote, they have a strong strategic incentive to try to induce voters to cast a cooperative ballot. 7 Yet, influencing domestic public opinion through foreign interventions is a difficult task. Not only is there a risk that these efforts may backfire, 8 but foreign governments face private information and time-inconsistency problems that make it difficult for them to credibly communicate their actual resolve not to accommodate a non-cooperative vote. 9 Because non-accommodation also imposes costs on those other countries themselves, their pledge to punish such a vote ex post may suffer from credibility issues.
Much research in international relations has shown that one way to overcome such credibility problems is to send costly signals that reveal oneÕs true resolve. 10 By engaging in activities that create costs not only for the referendum country but also for themselves, foreign policymakers can more credibly signal that they would not be willing to accommodate the referendum countryÕs non-cooperative vote. As a result, such costly signals from foreign 7 See also Haskel 1980 , who argues that access to another society can provide foreign policymakers with power. 
3.! The 2015 Greek bailout referendum
To study the role of expectations and foreign intervention in foreign policy referendums, we focus on the July 2015 bailout referendum in Greece, a particularly interesting case of a foreign policy referendum with potentially wide-ranging spillover effects abroad. All Eurozone members had a strong interest in the Greek referendum because it was widely believed that a No-vote would effectively end GreeceÕs membership in the Eurozone.
Grexit was an outcome European policymakers had been trying to avoid for years lest it would likely lead to renewed financial market pressure on other European crisis-ridden countries such as Italy or Portugal and would also trigger massive losses in the budgets and central bank balance sheets of surplus countries such as Germany and the Netherlands. 11
Perhaps most importantly, Grexit would put the viability of the entire European monetary integration project into question. A non-cooperative referendum outcome could thus create potentially very large negative spillover effects for other Eurozone members. Unsurprisingly, foreign intervention in the referendum campaign was unusually high and the likely consequences of a non-cooperative referendum outcome were a hotly debated issue during the campaign. These features render the 2015 Greek bailout referendum a critical and insightful case for studying the role of expectations and the effects of foreign intervention in foreign policy referendums.
11 Grexit would almost certainly have been accompanied by a Greek default not just on its public debt (ca. !210bn in July 2015) but also its Target2 liabilities (ca. ! 100bn).
Set against the background of one of the deepest and most prolonged economic crises in recent decades, 12 the referendum was the culmination of a lengthy negotiation between the Greek government and the countryÕs creditors, in which neither side showed any willingness to compromise. Since the crisis started in 2010, ushering in a period marked by a sharp rise in unemployment and poverty levels, Greece had received two bailout packages on the condition of drastic austerity measures and structural reforms. Against that backdrop, the populist leftwing party of SYRIZA came to power in January 2015 with an explicit mandate to end austerity. The new government of Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras immediately embarked on an aggressive negotiation strategy aimed at softening the conditions attached to the existing bailout program in GreeceÕs favor. At the same time, worried about political contagion and moral hazard effects, the creditors remained firm in their resolve not to make any concessions.
In the meantime, as the country was facing increasing liquidity problems, it became clear that Greece would need an extension of the existing bailout arrangement beyond its 30 June 2015 expiration date. As that date drew nearer, events escalated. On 24 June 2015, the European Commission made a Ôtake-it-or-leave-itÕ proposal about the conditions attached to a bailout extension to Greece. Tsipras rejected the ultimatum and broke off negotiations accusing the creditors of blackmail and characterizing the proposal as an attempt to humiliate Greece. In the morning of June 27, Tsipras Ð in an effort to boost his bargaining leverage vis--vis the countryÕs creditors Ð surprised everyone by calling a referendum on the proposal to be held only one week later. To the dismay of European policymakers, he recommended that voters vote No, i.e., to reject the creditorsÕ proposal.
An intense week of campaigning followed. Two dominant narratives emerged in the public debate, in which all major political actors took very clear stances. The three moderate pro-EU parties, conservative Nea Demokratia, center-left PASOK, and centrist To Potami, in tandem with European policymakers warned that a vote against the bailout proposal would 12 Gourinchas, Philippon, and Vayanos 2016 inevitably result in GreeceÕs exit from the Eurozone. They argued that European policymakers would not give in to the Greek government for fear that granting Greece better terms in response to a non-cooperative referendum vote would signal a lack of resolve to enforcing existing rules, thereby inciting similar non-cooperative behavior by other countries and eventually undermining the stability of the Eurozone. As a result, they strongly advocated voting Yes. By contrast, the No-camp, led by Tsipras and the coalition government parties of SYRIZA and ANEL (populist right), argued that a rejection of the agreement would enhance GreeceÕs bargaining leverage in renewed negotiations with its creditors and ultimately result in debt forgiveness and less austerity. 13 This second narrative emphasized that GreeceÕs membership in the Eurozone was not at risk because Europeans would not want to damage the EMU project by allowing Greece to crash out of the euro. Greek voters were thus exposed to two very different competing narratives about the potential consequences of a noncooperative referendum outcome for the future of Greece and the Eurozone. Yes-vote and threatened that a No-vote would result in disorderly default and Grexit. 14 Moreover, foreign policymakers directly intervened in the campaign. On June 28, one day after Tspiras had called the referendum, Eurozone finance ministers decided not to extend the ongoing bailout program scheduled to end three days later. As a consequence, the ECB announced later in the day that it would not increase the Emergency Liquidity Assistance (ELA) funds it had been supplying to keep the Greek banking system afloat with the 13 The extreme right-wing Golden Dawn party (as well as a far-left faction of SYRIZA) also came out fervently in favor of a No-vote, but their position was that this would be a way for Greece to leave the Eurozone. 14 https://www.theguardian.com/business/2015/jun/29/greek-crisis-referendum-eurozone-vote-germany-franceitaly justification that such support could not be granted without a bailout program in effect. Faced with a bank run in the making, the Greek authorities decided later in the evening to call a bank holiday and impose capital controls. Both measures were meant to last at least until the day after the referendum and immediately caused long queues in front of the countryÕs ATMs. 15 Another major international event occurred two days later when an IMF loan expired and Greece became the first developed country ever to default on its debt to the IMF.
While threatening statements by foreign officials may have been nothing more than Ôcheap talkÕ, the creditorsÕ decision not to extend the existing bailout program or ELA assistance to Greek banks effectively amounted to a costly signal of their determination not to accommodate the anti-austerity mandate of the Greek government. Greece was being told in no less than unequivocal terms that the creditors would not budge in this game of ÔchickenÕ and that the country had to choose between the creditorsÕ path of austerity and leaving the euro. Recognizing the potential impact of this signal on the referendum campaign, Tsipras retorted that the creditorsÕ actions Òhad no other aim but to blackmail the will of the Greek people.Ó 16 Yet, those actions were not just costly for Greece but also for the creditors: the economic damage they inflicted on the Greek economy vastly increased the amount needed for an eventual third bailout package, which would ultimately have to be financed out of foreign coffers. In fact, whereas the sum needed for a third bailout program had been estimated to range between !30 billion and !50 billion just one month before the referendum, 17 the amount had risen to about !90 billion when a third bailout package was finally agreed on July12, 2015. 18 Despite all these international efforts to sway Greek voters to vote cooperatively on 5
July 2015, however, the bailout referendum ended in a 61%-39% landslide victory for the In fact, the bank closure lasted for three weeks and some capital controls still remain in place at the time of writing. 
4.! Research design and data
To understand the Greek vote in the 2015 bailout referendum and the role expectations and foreign interventions played in this context, we use original survey data from a poll we conducted on Saturday, 4 July 2015, one day before the referendum. Our nationwide, computer-assisted telephone survey covered 989 respondents identified through a multistage sampling process. 19 Our survey was fielded just some hours before the polling stations opened, allowing us to gain a very accurate depiction of the motives of the Greek people and their vote. Although few surveys correctly predicted the strong rejection of the creditor proposal in the referendum, our survey mirrors the actual referendum outcome. Excluding those who were undecided or not planning to vote, 58.0% of respondents in our sample said they would reject the bailout package, which is very close to the 61.3% rejection rate in the actual referendum.
Our analysis proceeds in two steps. We first analyze the role of expectations played for the vote choice in the Greek referendum using both regression analysis and matching methods. We then explore the ability of foreign policymakers to shape votersÕ expectations about the consequences of a non-cooperative vote through costly signals. For this purpose, we concentrate on the effect of the ECBÕs decision not to increase emergency liquidity assistance to Greek banks, which forced the Tsipras government to close the banks, arguably the biggest event in the campaign period. Overall, we show that expectations about the response of 19 In the first stage (cluster sampling), electoral districts were chosen, in the second stage (stratified sampling) strata within each cluster were identified based on socioeconomic characteristics and in the third stage, a simple random sample was drawn within each stratum. Because interviews were done on fixed telephone lines, the youngest respondents are somewhat under-and female respondents overrepresented. We therefore use population weights in our analyses to match the basic demographics of the Greek population. More than three quarters of respondents (76%) wanted to keep the euro, whereas only 13% of respondents preferred to leave the euro relative to staying in the Eurozone (about one tenth of respondents were undecided about this issue or did not answer). Interestingly, even among those voting No in the referendum, a clear majority (61%) favored keeping the euro, the option that was preferred by virtually all Yes voters (98%).
Our argument suggests that expectations about the consequences of a non-cooperative vote should be a key driver of voting behavior. To account for alternative determinants of referendum vote choice identified by existing research, we control for a number of additional variables. Most importantly, much research has shown that voterÕs partisan identification is a strong determinant of the vote in popular referendums. 21 Parties frame the issues at stake 22 and have a heuristic value for voters that allow them to overcome cognitive and information limitations around the referendum question. 23 Moreover, foreign policy referendums often turn into a contest about the incumbent partiesÕ popularity. 24 To control for these partisan and incumbency effects, we use the vote recall from the January 2015 general election in Greece and create dummy variables for the main political parties in Greece: the governing parties SYRIZA and ANEL, the conservative opposition party Nea Demokratia (reference category), the center-left PASOK, the centrist To Potami, and the radical right Golden Dawn. We also Past research has also shown that material interests affect vote choices in foreign policy referendums. 25 For Greece, this suggests that more educated people should be more inclined to vote Yes, because they tend to disproportionally benefit from international integration. In contrast, the young, the unemployed, private sector employees and the selfemployed, who have been hurt most by GreeceÕs adjustment programs, should be more inclined to vote against the bailout proposal than public officials and pensioners, who have seen lower decreases in their incomes. 26 We control for Education using an ordinal variable with the following categories 1) no education or primary studies; 2) secondary; 3) postsecondary and 4) tertiary education. Age is operationalized in six categories Ñ 18-24, 25-34, 35-44, 45-54, 55-64, and over 65 years oldÑ, and we include it as a continuous variable in all models. 27 Occupation is operationalized with a series of dummy variables: public sector employee, private sector employee, unemployed, farmers, entrepreneur, pensioners and others. We also control for gender and whether the voter lives in a rural or urban area.
5.! Vote choice in the 2015 Greek referendum: The role of expectations
How did expectations about the likely consequences of a non-cooperative referendum outcome influence voting behavior in the 2015 Greek referendum? To answer this question, we gauge the effect of expectations on the referendum vote net from the possible confounders described above by using both regression and data-preprocessing techniques. Substantively, and taking the partisan effects globally, these effects are somewhat larger than in other studies, 29 suggesting that parties played a particularly important role in the referendum campaign and that that voters were influenced by their preferred partyÕs recommendation. This is not surprising in this specific context, which was characterized by a polarized campaign, a short decision time of only one week and a complicated referendum question. Nonetheless, the marginal effects of the expectation variables remain large and their magnitude is comparable to the partisan effects.
In contrast, material interests and demographics do not seem to matter much once expectations, issue preference, and partisan identification are taken into account. The only exception is age, where older voters are, as expected, more likely to vote Yes than younger 28 The full logit regression analysis can be found in the online appendix. The results remain robust when we additionally control for an imputed indicator of nationalism and respondentsÕ evaluation of EU membership. 29 A key issue of concern is, of course, that partisan preferences and expectations are not independent from each other. To examine in more detail whether expectations have an independent effect on vote intentions or whether they are driven by partisanship and other variables such as issue preference, we repeat our analysis using matching analysis. Matching is a method of data pre-processing that allows us to pair ÒtreatedÓ cases with almost identical ÒcontrolÓ cases in order to estimate the treatment effects independent of shared confounders. 31
In our analysis, this means that each individual who is ÒtreatedÓ with the expectation that a non-cooperative referendum outcome will result in Grexit, is matched to another individual from our dataset who did not expect this outcome (the control category) but who is otherwise almost identical, meaning that he/she voted for the same party, had the same view of the euro and so on. 32 Matching analyses thus allow us to compare how different expectations about the consequences of a non-cooperative referendum outcome affect the vote intentions among individuals who are almost identical on all other relevant covariates. The advantage of the matching approach is not only that it allows us to evaluate more transparently the degree of similarity in pre-treatment covariates between control and treated units, it is also less model 30 
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31 for a review, see Sekhon 2009 32 We choose the Grexit option as the treatment status because it leaves the modal category in the control group, thus increasing the pool of control units to be selected for the matching. In the Appendix, we replicate the analysis using the ÒNegotiations will continueÓ option as the treatment status, placing the ÒGrexitÓ option together with the DKs in the control group. Balance is now worsened, although the treatment effect estimates are substantively identical. We opt for a binary rather than a trichotomous treatment because balance tests for the DK category would be seriously underpowered. dependent. 33 We employ two methods of data pre-processing, genetic matching and entropy balancing. 34 Although there are clear imbalances in the observable characteristics of the two groups in the raw data, including key demographics and the two most obvious attitudinal confounders, partisan preferences and attitudes towards the euro, these differences evaporate after the matching process. The matching process thus creates practically identical treatment and control distributions for all covariates, increasing our confidence in the results. Our analysis so far has centered on the unconditional effect of expectations because a vast majority of Greeks had a clear preference for remaining in the Eurozone. But 33 Sekhon 2009. Matching only assures balance on observable characteristics. The identifying assumption is that unobserved characteristics of control and treatment observations are similar. We cannot test this assumption, but with matching we can at least be more transparent than with parametric regression techniques about whether there is balance in observed pre-treatment characteristics. 34 The first is a nearest-neighbor matching method with balance optimization, the second a generalization of a propensity score weighting approach. For a more details as well as the balance statistics, see the online appendix. 35 To examine the sensitivity of our results, we additionally conducted a Rosenbaum test. The results suggest that the likelihood that we are omitting an important unobserved confounder is very small. expectations matter because they guide voters towards a vote choice that is consistent with their preferences. In our case for example, for the majority of Greeks, who wanted Greece to stay in the euro, the expectation that a No-outcome in the referendum would result in Grexit should drive them to vote for the Yes-option. For those, however, in favor of reintroducing a national currency, Grexit would be a desired outcome. Expectations about the consequences of a No-vote should thus matter much less for this latter group because of their embrace of Grexit. To see if this the case and to shed further light on the mechanism driving the effects of expectations on Greek votersÕ referendum choice, we therefore replicate our regression analysis from Figure 4 , to explore the extent to which votersÕ preferred outcome Ð staying in or leaving the Eurozone Ð conditioned the effect of expectations on their vote.
The conditional effects of expectations are shown in Figure 6 , which display the change in the predicted probability of voting No as a result of expecting Grexit or new negotiations, respectively, compared to those who are undecided. Consistent with our argument, we find that expectations matter greatly for those who want to stay in the euro. If these voters are convinced that a non-cooperative vote will lead to new negotiations, possibly with more leverage for Greece, their likelihood of voting against the bailout package increases by about 38 percentage points. But those who fear that a No-vote would result in Grexit, although they want to stay in the Eurozone, are 23 percentage points less likely to vote against the bailout proposal. In contrast, and as expected, expectations matter much less for those in favor of a return to the national currency. *** Figure 6 about here *** Taken together, these findings underscore that votersÕ expectations about the consequences of a non-cooperative outcome strongly influenced their referendum choice, especially for those voters who wanted to remain in the common currency.
6.! Can foreign policymakers influence expectations and the vote?
The 2015 Greek referendum campaign also provides a good environment to examine whether and how involvement by foreign policymakers can influence votersÕ expectations and ultimately vote intentions in favor of a cooperative vote. As discussed above, foreign policymakers not only issued stark warnings that a No-vote would spell the end of GreeceÕs membership in the Eurozone, 36 but also took costly measures designed to increase pressure on Greece and signal European policymakersÕ resolve to punish the country for a noncooperative referendum outcome. Our argument suggests that such a costly signal should shift votersÕ expectations towards a more pessimistic evaluation of the consequences of a No-vote, thus decreasing their propensity to vote against cooperation.
To examine how costly signals sent by foreign policymakers affect expectations and vote intentions, we examine how the ECBÕs decision not to raise ELA assistance and the subsequent decision of the Greek government to close the banks and impose capital controls influenced referendum vote intentions. Our argument suggests that if this foreign intervention indeed served as a credible signal of the creditorsÕ resolve not to accommodate a negative Greek referendum vote, the bank shutdown should increase the propensity of Greek voters to vote for the bailout proposal in the referendum. To test this empirical implication of our argument, Figure 7 uses data from all 33 public opinion polls published during the referendum campaign in Greece to show how the proportion of respondents intending *** Figure 7 about here *** 36 To examine the effect of foreign threats, we also analyzed the results of a survey experiment conducted shortly before the referendum campaign that randomly assigned warnings by domestic and foreign policymakers about the consequences of a debt default. The results (included in the online appendix) show that respondents were more willing to repay the debt when exposed to a warning by a foreign policymaker, although this effect depends on whom the policymaker represents. This suggests that foreign threats can be effective.
to vote Yes in the referendum evolved throughout the campaign. 37 We classify each poll according to the date of fieldwork and distinguish between polls conducted prior and posterior to the bank shutdown, which was announced in the evening of June 28, becoming effective the next day, June 29. 38 For each group of polls, we plot a local polynomial smoother that indicates the evolution of public opinion during each phase. As expected, the announcement of the bank closure and capital controls had a significant effect on vote intentions. In line with our argument that a costly foreign signal should increase support for a cooperative vote, the bank shutdown bumped up vote intentions in favour of the bailout package by approximately 10 percentage points, thus bringing the predicted outcome to a much narrower margin.
Although this did not ultimately change the outcome of the referendum, which was still rejected with only 39% Yes-votes, this is a fairly substantial increase in average vote intentions, which would have been able to sway the vote in a closer race.
To corroborate this finding, we asked voters in our referendum survey if they had Nonetheless, the net effect is positive, and these individual-level results correspond closely with the average 10 percentage point increase in Yes-vote intentions that we saw in the analysis of all polls shown in Figure 7 . 37 We plot the percentage of Yes-voters over all voters that declared an intention to vote Yes or No. For a list of polls used, see the online appendix. 38 For those cases where the date of fieldwork was not available, we take the date the poll was published. When a poll was conducted over two days, we consider the fieldwork was conducted between both days. No poll was conducted both before and after the announcement of the bank shutdown.
Our argument suggests that foreign signals influence the vote because they affect expectations about the likely foreign reaction to a non-cooperative referendum outcome. In the last step of our analysis, we examine this prediction empirically, testing whether the bank holiday predicts expectations about the consequences of a No-vote in the referendum. For this analysis, our dependent variable, expectations, is trichotomous (respondent expects Grexit, new negotiations, or does not know/answer). We therefore employ a multinomial logit regression model, where those that Òdid not know/answerÓ serve as reference category. This allows us to investigate whether shifts to and from this category can be attributed to the bank closure after controlling for all the covariates included in the previous analyses. 39 *** Figure 8 about here *** Figure 8 shows the determinants of respondentsÕ expectations about the consequences of a No-vote. In line with our findings on the determinants of the vote intention, our results show that both partisan attachments and euro preferences influence these expectations.
Sociodemographic variables, such as education and occupation, also seem to matter. The most relevant result, however, is that after controlling for all these influences on votersÕ expectations, the bank closure also affects peopleÕs expectations. Those who changed their vote intention because of the bank shutdown were significantly less optimistic about the likely foreign response to a No-vote: Substantively, the bank shutdown reduces the predicted probability of expecting new negotiations by almost 20 percentage points. 40 At the same time, the bank shutdown is associated with an increase in expectations that a No-vote would push the country towards Grexit by almost 10 percentage points. The strategy of European 39 The full multinomial analyses is displayed in the online appendix (table A.3). To mirror the previous analyses, we also conducted matching analyses. We again obtain substantively identical estimates of the effect of the bank closure on expectations (figures A.4 and A.5 in online appendix). Both approaches produce near-to-perfect balance and similar ATT estimates. 40 For both the analysis on vote intention and expectations, we also explored interactive effects between the bank shutdown and partisan variables, but did not find any evidence for an effect.
policymakers not to accommodate GreeceÕs new financing needs during the referendum campaign thus succeeded in making some voters more pessimistic about the likely consequences of a No-outcome in the referendum 41 .
Overall, these results demonstrate that the European policymakersÕ decision to take a hard line on Greece did indeed convince some voters that they would not accommodate a negative referendum outcome, increasing Greek votersÕ propensity to support the bailout
proposal. Yet our results also demonstrate the difficulties associated with this strategy.
Despite the huge cost that the ECBÕs decision generated, both for Greece and the other European states, this foreign intervention did not sway enough voters to change the referendum outcome. Our analysis thus suggests that while international actors can indeed affect expectations in referendum campaigns through costly signals, this influence has its limits.
Conclusion
In recent years, popular referendums about questions of international cooperation and supranational integration have posed an increasing challenge to European integration. What unites these referendums is that a direct democratic vote that rejects further cooperation or reverses existing levels of cooperation affects not just the referendum country, but is costly for other countries as well. At the same time, the response of the other countries to such a negative referendum outcome shapes how the vote will ultimately play out for the referendum country. In this strategic setting, foreign policymakers have incentives to warn domestic voters about a harsh foreign reaction to a non-cooperative referendum vote in order to induce them to vote cooperatively. Our paper has explored one aspect of this strategic setting, focusing on how votersÕ expectations about foreign reactions to a non-cooperative referendum outcome shape vote intentions, and whether foreign policymakers can influence these expectations. Leveraging survey data from the 2015 Greek bailout referendum, a referendum in which the stakes of other countries were particularly high, we showed that expectations about the likely consequences of a No-vote had an unusually large impact on vote choice. Voters more optimistic about the foreign response were much more likely to vote non-cooperatively, than voters expecting a harsh foreign reaction were much more likely to cast a Yes-vote. Our analysis also suggested that foreign policymakers were able to influence these expectations among some voters by sending a costly signal (cutting Greece off from additional financing) about their determination not to accommodate a non-cooperative referendum outcome. Our Note: Each dot/triangle represents a poll published during the referendum campaign. The blue curve denotes local average estimates, shaded areas denote 95% confidence bands. Sources for each poll in online appendix. 
